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ABSTRACT  
Audit firms are investing millions of dollars to develop artificial intelligence (AI) systems that 
will help auditors execute challenging tasks (e.g., evaluating complex estimates). Audit firms 
assume AI will enhance audit quality. However, a growing body of research documents 
“algorithm aversion” – the tendency for individuals to discount computer-based advice more 
heavily than human advice, although the advice is identical otherwise. Auditor susceptibility to 
algorithm aversion could prove costly for the profession and financial statements users. 
Accordingly, we examine how algorithm aversion manifests in auditor decisions using an 
experiment that manipulates the source of contradictory audit evidence (human specialist versus 
AI specialist system) and the degree of structure within the client’s estimation process (higher 
versus lower) for a complex estimate. Consistent with theory, we find evidence that algorithm 
aversion amplifies the persuasive effect of greater estimation structure, making auditors more 
likely to discount contradictory audit evidence and accept management’s preferred estimates.  
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1. Introduction 
Audit firms are making substantial investments in advanced technologies with the goal of 
enhancing the effectiveness, efficiency, and decision-usefulness of audits. One of the most 
promising advanced technologies under consideration is the application of machine learning or 
artificial intelligence (AI) on audit engagements. Industry experts estimate that each of the ‘Big 
4’ firms currently invest $250 million per year on AI and machine learning technology (Alliott 
[2017]). AI can synthesize large amounts of diverse and unstructured data, and some firms are 
harnessing these abilities to help auditors perform tasks that have traditionally been performed 
by human specialists, such as evaluating complex accounting estimates (e.g., commercial loan 
grades; KPMG [2016]). The audit profession believes that applying advanced technologies such 
as AI to the audit setting will enhance audit quality and provide significant benefits for auditors 
and clients (FEI [2017], EY [2018]). These benefits, however, will only materialize if auditors 
consider and incorporate the information produced by such systems into their evidence 
evaluation. Therefore, this study examines when and how receiving contradictory evidence from 
a firm’s AI system (i.e., “specialist system”) – rather than a firm’s human specialist – influences 
auditors’ evaluations of management’s complex estimates.1  
A growing body of research finds that individuals often exhibit “algorithm aversion” – 
the human tendency to discount advice from algorithms and rely more readily on human input, as 
compared to computer-generated input (e.g., Önkal, Goodwin, Thompson, Gonul, and Pollock 
[2009], Eastwood, Snook, and Luther [2012], Dietvorst, Simmons, and Massey [2015], 
Yeomans, Shah, Mullainathan, and Kleinberg [2017]). For example, identical stock forecasting 
                                                 
1 Following the Brookings Institution (e.g., West and Allen [2018]), our concept of AI incorporates intentionality, 
intelligence (i.e., “machine learning”), and adaptability. Consistent with audit firms intending to use their in-house 
AI systems similar to the way they currently use in-house “human” valuation specialists (e.g., KPMG [2016]), we 
hereafter refer to these as “specialist systems” and “human specialists”, respectively.  
2 
 
advice has a greater influence on individuals’ predictions when they believe that advice comes 
from a human instead of a computer-based model (Önkal et al. [2009]). Additionally, algorithm 
aversion persists even when individuals receive feedback that the algorithmic predictions are 
more accurate than their own predictions (Dietvorst et al. [2015]). Research also finds that 
algorithm aversion occurs in highly subjective settings (Yeomans et al. [2017]).  
The unique features of the audit environment make it uncertain whether and how 
algorithm aversion might manifest in auditor judgments and in the specific context of this study 
– auditors’ evaluations of complex estimates. Auditors lack sufficient expertise to perform some 
specialized tasks on their own, and in those cases, they are encouraged to rely on advice from 
experts (Martin, Rich, and Wilks [2006], PCAOB [2017a], PCAOB [2017b]). Additionally, due 
to the high degree of subjectivity and potential for management bias, auditors have strong 
incentives to rely on evidence from their firm’s specialists, particularly when that evidence 
contradicts management’s estimates. Thus, auditors might be quite willing to rely on audit 
evidence from AI-based specialist systems. Interestingly, some regulators have expressed 
concerns that auditors might over-rely on advanced audit technologies (Harris [2017]). Yet, at 
the same time, regulators have criticized auditors for under-relying on human specialists (e.g., 
PCAOB [2017a], Griffith [2018]). Therefore, the potential impact of algorithm aversion on 
auditor judgments remains an open research question. Furthermore, the effects of algorithm 
aversion might manifest uniquely in the audit setting.  
When evaluating complex estimates, auditors evaluate their firm’s evidence in 
conjunction with management’s evidence. Accordingly, we also examine how algorithm 
aversion influences the way auditors respond to persuasive attributes of management’s evidence. 
Auditors often evaluate the reasonableness of management’s complex estimates by testing 
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management’s estimation process (Griffith, Hammersley, and Kadous [2015]). We propose that 
the degree of structure within management’s estimation process will influence auditors’ 
evaluations of complex estimates. Following research on task structure and audit structure (e.g., 
Abdolmohammadi [1999], Hyatt and Prawitt [2001]), we define a more-structured estimation 
process as one with well-defined steps, fewer alternative inputs, and fewer potential solution 
paths, which constrains judgment and increases consistency in the estimation process. 
Alternatively, a less-structured process is one that involves fewer explicit steps and more 
alternative inputs, requiring more judgment and creating a more varied set of potential solution 
paths. Research finds that auditors prefer well-defined tasks and information that is more 
objective, quantified, and verifiable (Bamber, Snowball, and Tubbs [1989], Joe, Vandervelde, 
and Wu [2017]). Accordingly, we propose that greater estimation structure is a persuasive 
attribute of management’s estimates that can sway auditors toward evaluating management’s 
estimates and related evidence more favorably.  
Research documents that individuals use a relative-weighting process to evaluate 
competing information (e.g., Birnbaum [1976], Birnbaum, Wong, and Wong [1976]). As the 
persuasiveness of one piece of information increases, that piece of information is more heavily 
weighted and there is a corresponding (and proportionate) decline in the weighting of opposing 
information (Birnbaum and Stegner [1979]; Birnbaum and Mellers [1983]). We theorize that 
algorithm aversion will exacerbate the degree to which persuasive evidence attributes lead to a 
tradeoff in the weighting of competing information. That is, we propose persuasive information 
cues will have a greater influence on judgments when weighed against competing information 
from a computer-based source versus a human source. Accordingly, we predict that the 
persuasive influence of greater estimation structure will be amplified when auditors receive 
4 
 
contradictory evidence from a specialist system instead of a human specialist, leading auditors to 
judge the client’s balance as more reasonable and propose smaller adjustments.  
We conduct an experiment with 170 audit senior participants, manipulating the source of 
firm-provided evidence (human specialist versus specialist system) and the degree of structure in 
the client’s estimation process (higher versus lower). Participants in all conditions receive the 
same audit evidence from their own firm’s specialist regarding a banking client’s allowance for 
loan losses (“ALL”). This evidence suggests that the client’s ALL is understated (i.e., net income 
is overstated). The source of the firm-provided contradictory evidence is either the in-house 
valuation group (i.e., human specialist) or the proprietary AI system (i.e., specialist system); we 
use identical language to describe the accuracy, reliability, and calibration of the evidence in 
both source conditions. In the lower structure condition, management’s estimation process relies 
on the judgement of loan officers and credit analysts, who use a variety of methods to develop 
estimates for a key input (collateral values) for the ALL estimate. In the higher structure 
condition, management’s estimation process relies on client-selected, detailed market data to 
update collateral values in a uniform and systematic manner. Auditors’ consideration of available 
audit evidence forms the basis for their beliefs about whether and to what extent management’s 
estimates should be adjusted. Therefore, participants’ proposed audit adjustments serve as our 
dependent measure. 
Consistent with our theory-based expectations, we find that persuasive attributes of 
management’s evidence cause auditors to weight their own firm’s contradictory evidence 
differently, depending on whether it comes from a human specialist or specialist system. 
Specifically, higher (versus lower) estimation structure in management’s process leads to lower 
proposed audit adjustments when the audit firm’s contradictory evidence comes from a specialist 
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system instead of a human specialist. Additional analyses reveal that auditors judge the quality of 
management's evidence more favorably when it is higher in estimation structure, regardless of 
the source of the firm’s contradictory evidence (a specialist system or human specialist). 
However, consistent with theory, these more favorable perceptions of management’s evidence 
quality lead to smaller proposed adjustments when the firm’s evidence comes from a specialist 
system instead of a human specialist.  
Our study extends two streams of research. First, we contribute to a growing body of 
research in psychology and management science documenting individuals’ reluctance to allow 
computer-generated input to substitute for human advice (i.e., algorithm aversion). This study is 
the first to provide evidence of algorithm aversion in auditor judgments and it also demonstrates 
that in the audit setting, algorithm aversion is more nuanced than was documented in the prior 
literature. Specifically, algorithm aversion was only triggered when auditors weighed system 
evidence against client evidence from a more-structured estimation process, but when the 
subjectivity in client evidence was more obvious (i.e., less-structured estimation process), 
auditors’ judgments were not susceptible to algorithm aversion. Thus, it is perhaps encouraging 
that auditors only exhibit algorithm aversion when they perceive that the evidence supporting 
management’s estimate appears stronger. Nevertheless, it is still worrisome that algorithm 
aversion might make it easier to sway auditors into thinking that potentially biased estimates are 
fairly stated.  
Second, we contribute to the growing literature around complex accounting estimates. 
Measurement uncertainty continues to be a critically important risk for financial reporting 
stakeholders (Bratten, Gaynor, McDaniel, Montague, and Sierra [2013], Dennis, Griffin, and 
Johnstone [2018]). Additionally, due to the high degree of measurement uncertainty and 
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subjectivity, appropriately evaluating complex estimates remains a challenge for auditors 
(Cannon and Bedard [2017], Joe et al. [2017]). Recent findings indicate that auditors are willing 
to discount (and perhaps even ignore) contradictory evidence from valuation specialists (PCAOB 
[2017a], Griffith [2019]). We contribute to this literature by identifying estimation structure as 
an attribute of management’s estimates that can contribute auditors’ propensity to discount 
contradictory evidence, especially when that evidence comes from a specialist system.  
Our findings are relevant to audit firms and regulators. The audit environment is quickly 
evolving due to technological advancement (Raphael [2017], Tysiac [2017]). We provide 
evidence that the implementation of advanced specialist systems could alter auditor judgments in 
a way that inadvertently undermines audit quality. Though it is important to evaluate the 
reliability and appropriateness of new audit tools, it is equally important to consider how auditors 
will interact with and incorporate evidence from these tools on their engagements.  
2. Theory and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 BACKGROUND 
Audit firms are making significant investments in advanced technologies such as data 
analytics, drones, and robotic process automation (PwC [2017], Austin, Carpenter, Christ, and 
Nielson [2018], Christ, Emett, Summers, and Wood [2019]). Some firms have deployed 
proprietary applications that streamline audit processes and enable the use of mobile devices to 
collect audit evidence (e.g., for inventory observations; Deloitte [2018]). Other firms are in early 
stages of implementing robotic process automation for routine and simple audit tasks, such as 
debt and cash confirmations (Cooper, Holderness, Sorensen, and Wood [2018]). One of the most 
advanced technologies under consideration is the incorporation of AI on audit engagements.  
Audit firms plan to use AI to assist auditors with some of the most challenging audit 
tasks, such as evaluating management’s complex estimates (KPMG [2016], Murphy [2017]). For 
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example, KPMG is developing an AI system to help auditors evaluate commercial loan grades 
(KPMG [2016]). With its ability to integrate and process large amounts of diverse and 
unstructured data through machine learning, AI is well-suited to help auditors evaluate 
management’s assumptions and develop independent estimates. Therefore, as audit firms 
continue developing AI systems to produce evidence around complex estimates – a task 
traditionally performed by human specialists – it is critical to understand how auditors will 
respond to the evidence provided by these AI systems.2 
2.2 AUDITORS AND ALGORITHM AVERSION 
A substantial body of research from psychology, medicine, and management science 
documents the human tendency to prefer and rely more on information when it comes from a 
human source rather than when it comes from a computer source (Promberger and Baron [2006], 
Önkal et al. [2009], Eastwood et al. [2012], Dietvorst et al. [2015], Yeomans et al. [2017]). For 
example, Önkal et al. [2009] show that when forecasting stock prices, individuals are more likely 
to discount computer-generated input than human input – although the information provided by 
the two sources is otherwise identical. Similarly, when predicting student performance, 
individuals prefer to rely on their own predictions (or predictions from another person) rather 
than predictions produced by an algorithm, even after receiving feedback that the algorithm’s 
predictions are consistently more accurate than their own (Dietvorst et al. [2015]). The literature 
refers to this tendency to discount computer-generated “advice” in favor of human advice as 
algorithm aversion. 
                                                 
2 It is important to note that AI systems differ from decision aids in that they produce audit evidence by simulating 
human judgment – and auditors are expected to incorporate this evidence into their decisions. Thus, prior accounting 
research that examined auditors’ use of decision aids (e.g., checklists to promote adherence to accounting standards 
or firm policies) on fraud risk assessments or internal controls testing tasks do not apply to auditor’s use of AI (e.g., 
Kachelmeier and Messier [1990], Messier [1995], Glover, Prawitt, and Spilker [1997], Anderson, Moreno, and 
Mueller [2003], Asare and Wright [2004]). 
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Research on algorithm aversion typically examines objective prediction tasks (e.g., 
forecasting student performance) with observable, correct answers (e.g., realized GPAs). 3 
However, recent findings indicate that algorithm aversion also occurs in subjective settings 
where gaining consensus on the correct answer(s) is more difficult (Yeomans et al. [2017]). 
Specifically, Yeomans et al. [2017] find that although an algorithmic joke recommendation 
system outperforms human recommenders, individuals are reluctant to rely on advice from the 
system when making joke recommendations to others or when receiving joke recommendations 
for themselves. Yeomans et al.’s [2017] findings are particularly relevant to our experimental 
context (i.e., auditing complex estimates) because they demonstrate that algorithm aversion can 
persist in highly subjective domains where accuracy is ill-defined. 
Auditing management’s complex estimates is challenging because the estimates are 
highly subjective, lack objectively correct answers, and there is limited opportunity for timely 
outcome feedback (Martin et al. [2006], Christensen, Glover, and Wood [2012]; Bratten et al. 
[2013], Griffith [2018]). As a means of reducing the risk and uncertainty associated with 
complex estimates, it is common for firm-employed valuation specialists to assist auditors with 
their evaluations of these estimates (PCAOB [2015, 2017a], Cannon and Bedard [2017]). 
Importantly, due to the high degree of subjectivity associated with complex estimates, auditors 
often receive evidence from their firm specialists that contradicts management’s estimates 
(Griffith et al. [2015a], Cannon and Bedard [2017], Griffith [2019]). The rapid advancement and 
planned use of audit technologies point to a future in which auditors are considering 
contradictory evidence produced by their firm’s specialist system instead of a human specialist. 
                                                 
3 Some research suggests that algorithm aversion occurs because individuals expect computer-generated information 
to be perfect. Thus, when individuals observe any inaccuracies in highly reliable (but not perfect) computer-
generated advice, they will discount this advice more than human advice (Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck and Dawe [2002], 
Madhavan and Wiegmann [2007], Dietvorst et al. [2015], Prahl and Van Swol [2017]). 
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While firms anticipate that these specialist systems will improve audit outcomes, the literature on 
algorithm aversion suggests that auditors will weight their own firm’s evidence differently (e.g., 
discounting contradictory evidence) when it comes from a specialist system instead of a human 
specialist.  
However, there are important reasons why algorithm aversion effects might be more 
nuanced in the audit setting when compared to contexts examined in prior studies. First, 
regulators have expressed concerns that auditors will over-rely on advanced audit technologies 
(Harris [2017]). Consistent with this concern, prior research finds that individuals are more 
willing to rely on advice from others (i.e., humans) as task complexity increases (Schrah, Dalal, 
and Sniezek [2006], Gino and Moore [2007]). Due to the difficulty associated with auditing 
complex estimates, for which auditors often lack sufficient expertise to evaluate (Martin et al. 
[2006], Bratten et al. [2013], PCAOB [2015, 2017a, 2017b], Griffith [2019]), auditors might be 
more willing to rely on evidence from specialist systems than the participants in prior algorithm 
aversion studies. Second, complex estimates are particularly vulnerable to management bias 
(Bratten et al. [2013]) and regulators continue to caution auditors to evaluate the risk of 
management bias in the subjective aspects of estimation processes (e.g., PCAOB [2007], 
PCAOB [2010a], Hanson [2012], PCAOB [2018 p. 1]). Thus, auditors have significant legal and 
regulatory incentives to avoid discounting contradictory evidence from their firms’ expert 
systems (e.g., PCAOB [2010b, 2015]). Therefore, we consider how algorithm aversion may 
manifest in a more nuanced manner in the context of auditing complex estimates. 
2.3 AUDITORS’ CONSIDERATION OF COMPETING INFORMATION AND ALGORITHM AVERSION 
While theory from the algorithm aversion literature generally suggests that auditors will 
rely less on evidence that comes from a specialist system (instead of a human specialist), auditors 
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do not evaluate evidence from firm specialists in isolation. Auditors consider any contradictory 
evidence obtained from firm specialists in conjunction with other evidence they have gathered, 
including evidence provided by management, when forming their own opinion about whether 
management’s estimates are fairly stated (PCAOB [2010a, 2014a, 2014b], Hanson [2012], 
CPAB [2015a, 2015b], IFIAR [2015], PCAOB [2017a]). When evidence from these sources are 
in conflict, auditors must use professional judgment to determine how to incorporate the 
competing evidence into their decision making (PCAOB [2015, 2017a, 2017b]).  
Research indicates that individuals use a relative-weighting process to reconcile 
conflicting information (Birnbaum [1976], Birnbaum et al. [1976]). In this relative-weighting 
process, as the persuasive strength of one piece of evidence increases, that information is more 
heavily weighted and there is a proportionate decline in the weighting of competing information 
(Birnbaum and Stegner [1979], Birnbaum and Mellers [1983]). Thus, persuasive information 
attributes can prompt a tradeoff in the influence of two competing information sources. Based on 
prior algorithm aversion research, we further theorize that the magnitude of this tradeoff will 
depend on whether the opposing information comes from a computer system or a human source. 
Specifically, we expect attributes that can sway an individual that one perspective is correct or 
reasonable will have a greater persuasive influence on judgments when the opposing perspective 
(or information) comes from an algorithm instead of a human. 
Following this, we expect algorithm aversion to manifest in the audit environment by 
amplifying the degree to which persuasive attributes of management’s evidence influence 
auditors’ related judgments. In the context of auditing complex estimates, we expect the 
persuasive attributes of management’s evidence will influence auditor judgments more strongly 
when the firm’s contradictory evidence comes from a specialist system instead of a human 
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specialist. Prior accounting research has identified many evidence attributes (e.g., amount, 
consistency, congruency with management incentives, quantification) that are persuasive in 
accounting and auditing decision contexts (Caster and Pincus [1996], Goodwin [1999], Kadous, 
Koonce, and Towry [2005], Kaplan, O’Donnell, and Arel [2008], Joe et al. [2017]). For example, 
Joe et al. [2017] demonstrate that a higher degree of quantification in information can increase 
auditors’ comfort level with the reasonableness of management’s subjective estimates, even if 
that quantification does not provide new diagnostic evidence. Although there are several 
attributes of audit evidence that can have a persuasive influence on auditor judgments, we focus 
on an important contextual feature of management’s estimation process that has not been 
examined by prior research – the degree of structure within management’s estimation process 
(i.e., “estimation structure”).  
2.4 COMPLEX ESTIMATES AND ESTIMATION STRUCTURE 
Unlike account balances based on historical cost, where relatively more objective audit 
evidence is available, complex estimates are inherently ambiguous, uncertain, and lack 
verifiability (Bratten et al. [2013]). The task of evaluating the reasonableness of management’s 
complex estimates is correspondingly difficult for auditors (Christensen et al. [2012], Glover, 
Taylor, and Wu [2019]). Research finds that auditors typically approach this audit task by testing 
management’s estimation process (Griffith et al. [2015a]). However, accounting standards allow 
for a variety of estimation methods, and even highly trained experts can disagree about the best 
method for developing an estimate for a given asset or liability (Bratten et al. [2013]). Because 
accounting standards allow managers significant discretion in how they develop estimates, 
auditors encounter a wide variety of estimation methods in the field, including estimation 
processes with varying degrees of structure (Bratten et al. [2013]). 
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Prior research characterizes structured tasks as well-defined tasks with fewer alternative 
inputs and solution paths, thus requiring less judgment. In contrast, unstructured tasks have many 
alternative inputs and solution paths, and require more judgment (Payne [1976], Bonner [1994], 
Abdolmohammadi [1999], Bratten et al. [2013]). Similarly, Hyatt and Prawitt [2001 p. 265] 
describe a relatively unstructured audit firm as one that offers little “guidance or other 
mechanisms to encourage control and uniformity…” In contrast, a more structured firm imposes 
“more specific guidance and control mechanisms to enhance consistency and uniformity.” We 
extend this concept of structure to management’s estimation processes. For example, 
management might use a more-structured estimation process that is marked by a well-defined 
methodology with detailed steps and well-specified inputs, which give rise to more consistent 
and uniform estimates (i.e., a limited solution path set). Alternatively, management could use a 
less-structured process that involves fewer explicit steps and more alternative inputs, resulting in 
more judgment and a more varied solution path set.  
Research finds that accountants and auditors are averse to ambiguity and have a strong 
preference for well-defined and more verifiable tasks (Bamber et al. [1989], Nelson and Kinney 
[1997], Kadous et al. [2005], Luippold and Kida [2012], Zimbelman and Waller [1999]). 
Auditors appear to cope with the ambiguity and uncertainty associated with complex estimates 
by focusing on the quantifiable and verifiable aspects of management’s estimate (Griffith et al. 
[2015a], Joe et al. [2017]). For example, Griffith et al. [2015a p. 858] observe that auditors are 
more comfortable using a “highly structured…checklist -like approach [that] easily 
accommodates verifying discrete components of management’s estimates,” even though doing so 
can prevent auditors from making more holistic evaluations of the estimates.4 Overall, this 
                                                 
4 Griffith et al. [2015a p. 856] note that, “the verification approach makes auditors more likely to overlook or justify 
conflicting evidence” and more likely to be influenced by management.  
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research suggests that auditors prefer higher levels of structure and less ambiguity.  Accordingly, 
we expect that a relatively higher degree of estimation structure will make management’s 
evidence around complex estimates relatively more persuasive for auditors. Therefore, as 
management’s estimation process becomes more structured, auditors will place more weight on 
management’s evidence, which will also cause auditors to more heavily discount contradictory 
evidence from firm specialists (i.e., a relative tradeoff between the two competing sources of 
audit evidence). 
In our earlier discussion about algorithm aversion and auditors’ consideration of 
competing information, we propose that persuasive attributes of management’s evidence will 
have a greater influence on auditor judgments when auditors receive contradictory evidence from 
a specialist system instead of a human specialist. Thus, when auditors evaluate conflicting 
information related to management’s estimates, we predict that the persuasive effect of greater 
estimation structure will be amplified when the source of the firm’s contradictory evidence is a 
specialist system instead of a human specialist. Accordingly, we propose the following 
interaction hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: Relatively more structure in management’s estimation process will lead to 
greater auditor discounting of contradictory evidence, especially when that 
contradictory evidence comes from a specialist system instead of a human 
specialist. 
 
3. Method 
3.1 PARTICIPANTS 
Participants are 170 Big 4 audit seniors with a reported mean of 4.02 years of public 
accounting experience.5 Participants report spending approximately 50 percent of their time 
                                                 
5 We obtained institutional review approval for this study. We received 199 complete responses from experienced 
audit senior associates. We also received three additional responses from individuals who indicated they had less 
than one year of public accounting experience, and we omit the responses from these three participants as they do 
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working on public clients and are relatively likely to provide input into decisions related to 
proposed audit adjustments in a typical year (mean of 5.10 on a scale from 0 = “not at all likely” 
to 7 = “highly likely”). Overall, participants have experience consistent with auditors who are 
typically involved with auditing complex estimates (e.g., Griffith et al. [2015a]). Very few 
participants (4 percent) report experience working with AI systems on an audit engagement; 
consistent with our understanding that audit firms have not yet fully implemented these systems.6  
3.2 EXPERIMENTAL AUDIT CASE 
Participants assume the role of an in-charge auditor on the financial statement audit of 
Heartland National Bank. Participants first receive background information about their 
hypothetical audit firm (Clark & Miller, LLP) and Heartland’s allowance for loan losses 
(“ALL”). Participants then receive information about the methodology that Clark & Miller uses 
to evaluate clients’ ALL calculations. In all conditions, Clark & Miller’s methodology involves 
using information from a variety of sources to develop independent loan grades, including the 
use of either an in-house human valuation specialist or the firm’s AI-based specialist system. 
Following this, participants receive information about the current audit of Heartland’s 
ALL. Differences between Heartland’s loan grades and Clark & Miller’s independent loan 
grades indicate a potential audit difference that would overstate earnings by $28 million. Case 
details indicate that the audit team’s investigation finds that the root cause of these differences 
relates to disagreements about estimated collateral values, which are a key input in the ALL 
calculation. Due to rapidly-increasing real estate prices, evidence from both management and the 
audit firm indicates that many of the appraisals used to determine collateral values are “stale” 
                                                 
not possess the requisite experience for the experimental task. We also exclude 29 responses from participants that 
provided incorrect answers to manipulation check questions. See Results section for additional discussion.  
6 When we exclude participants that indicate experience working with AI systems or control for their experience 
with AI in our models, our results and inferences remain unchanged. 
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(i.e., outdated) as of the balance sheet date – and therefore need to be adjusted upward. However, 
Heartland’s methodology adjusts these collateral values more aggressively (i.e., higher values) 
than Clark & Miller’s methodology. 
Participants then view side-by-side reports from Clark & Miller and Heartland that 
summarize the respective methodologies that each uses to roll-forward collateral values from the 
appraisal date to the balance sheet date. These reports indicate that Clark & Miller examined 
three commercial real estate price indices, while Heartland’s management examined only the two 
most aggressive of these three indices. Consequently, Heartland’s methodology results in 
significantly higher collateral values (resulting in lower ALL balance and higher earnings) than 
Clark & Miller’s methodology. These case details suggest that management may have estimated 
collateral values, and thus the ALL balance, in a biased manner.  
Following these reports, we provide participants with a comprehensive summary of the 
issue. The last part of this summary informs participants that Heartland management is confident 
in its methodology and prefers not to make an adjustment to the ALL. Immediately following 
this summary, participants recommend a proposed adjustment.7 When evaluating management’s 
complex estimates, the auditor’s consideration of the available evidence (and relative weighting 
of that evidence) forms the basis for whether there is a proposed adjustment to management’s 
estimate, and the magnitude of such adjustment. For example, full reliance on firm-provided 
contradictory evidence would result in larger proposed adjustments. In contrast, discounting 
evidence that conflicts with management’s estimate would result in greater agreement with 
management’s preferred balance and, on average, result in smaller proposed adjustments. 
                                                 
7 Senior leaders at a participating firm indicated that experienced senior associates are qualified to recommend 
proposed adjustments and that partners would likely consider these recommendations in their own decisions. For 
brevity, we refer to this variable as “proposed adjustments” throughout the remainder of the manuscript. 
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Therefore, the effects predicted by our hypothesis should be evident in auditors’ proposed 
adjustments. Finally, participants complete a post-experiment questionnaire. Figure 1 presents 
the flow of the experimental procedures. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here.] 
3.3 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
We use a 2 x 2 between-subjects experimental design that manipulates the source of an 
audit firm’s evidence around a complex estimate (i.e., “Source”) and the degree of structure in 
the client’s estimation process (i.e., “Structure”). We manipulate Source at two levels: human 
specialist and specialist system. In the human specialist condition, Clark & Miller employs an 
internal group of specialists that calculates independent loan grades for individual loans. In the 
specialist system condition, we inform participants that Clark & Miller utilizes a proprietary AI 
system (i.e., a specialist system called the “Amadeus System”) that develops these grades. The 
firm methodology for calculating loan grades and the resulting reports (i.e., audit evidence) from 
these two sources are identical in both conditions.  
When describing these firm sources of evidence, we include statements in both 
treatments to equalize the acceptability of the two sources and legitimize the specialist system in 
the same way that audit firms legitimize human specialists in practice (see Appendix A). For 
example, participants in both conditions are told that their firm considers the resulting loan 
grades (from either source) to be an approved source of audit evidence. Overall, these design 
choices help familiarize the participants with the source of audit evidence and ensure that 
observed effects are due to the human/non-human nature of the information source rather than 
reluctance to deviate from more traditional firm methodologies.  
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We also manipulate Structure at two levels: higher structure and lower structure. In the 
higher structure condition, Heartland’s management uses a more limited and consistent solution 
path to develop estimates, relying on detailed, verifiable market data to roll forward collateral 
value estimates. In the lower structure condition, management relies heavily on the judgement of 
its loan officers and credit analysts to update underlying collateral values using a variety of 
methods. For example, these loan officers and credit analysts can use information from 
comparable sales, local market trends, and/or discussions with real estate brokers, yielding a 
more varied solution path for estimates (see Appendix B for more detail). This design holds 
management’s estimated collateral values and the potential for management bias in these values 
constant and manipulates only the process by which management generates those values.8  
4. Results 
4.1 MANIPULATION CHECKS 
We evaluate our Source manipulation by asking participants whether the audit team 
received input from the firm’s internal valuation group or the Amadeus system. Only 11 
participants incorrectly identified the Source of the audit firm’s evidence. With regard to our 
Structure manipulation, we varied whether management’s estimation process relies on the 
systematic application of detailed market data (higher structure) or on the judgment and expertise 
of loan officers and/or credit analysts (lower structure). Accordingly, we asked participants to 
correctly identify management’s estimation methodology and 18 additional participants were 
                                                 
8 It is important to note that management has significant discretion to alter inputs and manipulate recorded amounts 
in both conditions of estimation structure. For example, swapping out a single price index in the higher structure 
condition influences the collateral value estimates for every loan and can materially alter the ALL calculation. 
Similarly, systematically biased judgments in the lower structure condition generate inappropriate collateral values 
at the loan level that can accumulate to a material misstatement across the portfolio. 
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unable to do so. Since these 29 participants did not properly attend to our manipulations, we 
eliminate their responses from our analyses, resulting in a final sample of 170 participants.9  
To further gauge the effectiveness of our Structure manipulation, we ask participants, 
“To what extent would you characterize management’s method for estimating updated collateral 
values as structured?” (1 = “Not at All Structured” and 7 = “Very Structured”). Participants in 
the higher structured condition reported that management’s estimation process was more 
structured than participants in the lower structured condition (4.8 versus 3.8, respectively; p < 
0.01), indicating that Structure is successfully manipulated in our final sample. 
As previously discussed, we include language in the case materials to equalize the 
legitimacy of the specialist-provided evidence across both levels of our Source manipulation – 
including the firm’s endorsement of the respective Source (see Appendix B). Accordingly, we 
ask participants to indicate whether they agree with the statement that their audit firm views the 
respective Source as a “credible source of audit evidence” (1 = “Strongly Disagree” and 7 = 
“Strongly Agree”). Participants in the human specialist and specialist system conditions report 
similarly high levels of agreement with that statement (5.92 versus 5.61, respectively; p > 0.10, 
two-tailed, untabulated). Further, mean responses in both conditions are significantly higher than 
the scale midpoint of 3.5 (p < 0.01, two-tailed, untabulated). Thus, participants in both Source 
conditions were similarly assured that their respective source was deemed reliable and approved 
by the firm.  
                                                 
9 While all of our results remain significant at the reported levels when we include responses from 10 participants 
who only missed the Source question, the interaction effect becomes insignificant when we either include responses 
from 18 participants who only missed the Structure question (p = 0.14) or all 199 observations (p = 0.16) (one 
participant missed both manipulation check questions). Overall, the participants who missed these questions did not 
sufficiently attend to the case details and the inclusion of these responses adds noise to our statistical analyses, 
weakening the power of our tests. We discuss how manipulation check failures affect each of our experimental 
conditions in the notes to Table 1. Consistent with directional expectations, p-values reported throughout the paper 
are equivalent to one-tailed tests, unless otherwise noted. 
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4.2 HYPOTHESIS TESTS 
We test our hypothesis using a 2 x 2 ANOVA model with auditors’ proposed adjustments 
(“Proposed”) as the dependent variable and Source and Structure as independent variables. 
Table 1, Panel A, presents descriptive statistics for Proposed and Table 1, Panel B, reports the 
model results. Figure 2 presents a graphical illustration of these results.  
[Insert Table 1 and Figure 2 about here.] 
Our hypothesis predicts that higher (versus lower) structure in management’s estimation 
process will cause auditors to more heavily discount contradictory evidence when the source of 
the firm’s contradictory evidence is a system specialist versus a human specialist. This suggests 
that the effect of Structure on Proposed will be more negative in the specialist system condition 
than in the human specialist condition. Consistent with our hypothesis, there is a significant 
interaction (F1,166 = 4.00, p = 0.02). Additionally, the graphical pattern in Figure 2 and the simple 
effect tests reported in Table 1, Panel C support our hypothesis. Specifically, we find that when 
the source of the firm’s contradictory evidence was a human specialist, there was no statistical 
difference in the mean proposed adjustments across the higher and lower structure conditions 
(19.81 versus 22.13, F1,166 = 1.11; p = 0.15). However, when the source was the firm’s specialist 
system, auditors’ average proposed adjustments were smaller in the higher structure condition 
than in the lower structure condition (11.20 versus 19.94; F1,166 = 13.89, p < 0.01). Overall, the 
observed pattern of the results suggest that algorithm aversion amplifies the persuasive influence 
of Structure in management’s estimation process, consistent with our hypothesis. 
Given the significant Source X Structure interaction, we also conduct simple effect tests 
to further explore the effects of algorithm aversion in the audit setting. Consistent with algorithm 
aversion, when estimation structure is higher, auditors discount the firm’s contradictory evidence 
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more heavily in the specialist system condition than in the human specialist condition. As shown 
in Table 1, Panel D, participants in the higher structure condition propose smaller adjustments 
when the firm’s contradictory evidence comes from a specialist system instead of a human 
specialist (11.20 versus 19.81; F1,166 = 13.21, p < 0.01). However, in the lower structure 
condition, proposed adjustments do not vary depending on the source of the firm’s contradictory 
evidence (22.13 vs. 19.94; F1,166 = 1.01, p = 0.16). These results suggest that the effects of 
algorithm aversion are likely contextually dependent in the audit setting. 
4.3 MODERATED MEDIATION ANALYSES 
 In developing our expectations, we theorize that auditors will prefer more-structured 
estimation processes (relative to less-structured processes), leading to relatively smaller proposed 
adjustments. We further theorize that this effect will be stronger when the audit firm’s 
contradictory evidence comes from a system specialist instead of a human specialist. To provide 
additional support for our theory, we use conditional process analyses to examine whether the 
perceived quality of management’s evidence (“Quality”) mediates our predicted effects of 
Structure and Source on Proposed (i.e., moderated mediation).10   
There are two ways Source might moderate the indirect effect of Structure on Proposed 
through Quality. First, consistent with Model 8 in the PROCESS Macro (Hayes [2018]), Source 
might moderate the effect of Structure on Quality. Specifically, higher estimation structure might 
more readily translate to favorable perceptions of management’s evidence in the specialist 
system condition than in the human specialist condition, thereby leading to relatively smaller 
proposed adjustments. Alternatively, higher structure might lead to higher perceived evidence 
quality, regardless of Source. Then, due to algorithm aversion, Source could amplify the 
                                                 
10 We ask participants to rate the quality of the evidence provided by management on a seven-point scale (1 = “Very 
Low Quality”; 7 = “Very High Quality”). 
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influence that higher perceived evidence quality has on auditors’ adjustment decisions. That is, 
consistent with Model 15 of the PROCESS Macro, Source might moderate the effect of Quality 
on Proposed, such that the effect of Quality on Proposed is more negative in the specialist 
system condition than in the human specialist condition. The following analyses help disentangle 
whether algorithm aversion affects the way auditors initially perceive management’s evidence 
and/or how auditors ultimately use management’s evidence to make decisions. 
We use Model 8 to test the first of these two mediation possibilities (see Figure 3, Panel 
A). Results reveal that the indirect effect of Structure on Proposed through Quality (i.e., βa * βb) 
is significant in both the specialist system condition (90% confidence interval of -2.91 to -0.45, 
equivalent to p < 0.05) and the human specialist condition (90% confidence interval of -3.89 to   
-0.54). However, the index of moderated mediation is not significant (i.e., 90% confidence 
interval of -0.74 to 1.97), indicating that these indirect effects do not differ across our Source 
conditions. These results suggest that auditors evaluate the quality of management’s evidence 
more favorably when estimation structure is higher, regardless of whether the firm’s 
contradictory evidence comes from a specialist system or human specialist. 
 [Insert Figure 3 about here.] 
We next use Model 15 to examine whether Source instead moderates the degree to which 
Quality affects Proposed (see Figure 3, Panel B). The results show that the indirect effect is 
significant in the specialist system condition (90% confidence interval of -5.53 to -1.43), but not 
in the human specialist condition (90% confidence interval of -2.37 to 0.49). Additionally, the 
index of moderated mediation is significant (90% confidence interval of -4.96 to -0.34). This 
indicates that the indirect effect of Structure on Proposed, through Quality, is significantly more 
negative in the specialist system condition than in the human specialist condition, consistent with 
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our hypothesis development. Collectively, we interpret these findings as additional support for 
our underlying theory. Namely, algorithm aversion affects the way auditors use management’s 
evidence, rather than the way they perceive that evidence.  
4.4 SOURCE CREDIBILITY 
Consistent with algorithm aversion, we are primarily interested in how the nature (i.e., 
human vs. non-human) of a firm source of evidence affects auditors’ reliance on that evidence. 
Although we explicitly inform participants in both Source conditions that the firm considers the 
specialist to be an approved source of audit evidence (see Appendix A), it is possible that 
participants nonetheless could have perceived differences in credibility across the two sources of 
evidence (specialist system vs. human specialist). We therefore test whether our results are 
robust to these potential differences. 
Source credibility theory identifies objectivity and expertise as factors that affect the 
credibility of a source (Birnbaum and Stegner [1979], Pornpitakpan [2004]). Accordingly, 
participants rate their perceptions of the objectivity (Objectivity) and expertise 
(Source_Expertise) of the specialist system or human specialist.11 Perceptions of objectivity do 
not differ across our Source conditions (p = 0.72, two-tailed, untabulated). However, participants 
in the specialist system condition report higher levels of concern about expertise than those in the 
human specialist condition (p < .01, two-tailed, untabulated). To rule out the possibility that 
these participants’ perceptions of source credibility drive our results, we run a 2 x 2 ANCOVA 
that is similar to our main hypothesis-testing model but includes Objectivity and 
Source_Expertise as covariates. The ANCOVA results reported in Table 2 are similar to those in 
                                                 
11 We ask participants to rate the objectivity of the firm source (i.e., the specialist system or human specialists) (1 =  
“Not at All Objective”; 7 = “Very Objective”) and to assess the extent to which they were concerned about the 
knowledge and expertise of the firm source (1 = “Not at All Concerned”; 7 = “Very Concerned”).  
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our main analyses and our inferences are unchanged. Specifically, the Source X Structure 
interaction (F(1, 164) = 3.22, p = 0.04) result remains significant.  
[Insert Table 2 about here.] 
Similarly, when we include Objectivity and Source_Expertise as covariates in our 
PROCESS Macro models, the significance levels we report in our Moderated Mediation 
Analyses are the same (untabulated) and our inferences are unchanged. Therefore, although 
participants report relatively higher levels of concern about Source_Expertise in the specialist 
system condition, our results are fully robust to controlling for these differences. Thus, consistent 
with algorithm aversion, the human/non-human nature of the firm source appears to be the 
primary driver of our findings, not source credibility or related expertise concerns.12  
5. Conclusion 
To date the auditing profession has invested hundreds of millions of dollars with plans for 
further investments to develop and implement AI systems and the leaders of multi-national 
accounting firms and the audit profession assert that these investments will enhance audit quality 
(FEI 2017; EY 2018). One area that audit firms have targeted for AI innovation is the use of 
specialist systems to provide “expert” evaluations and recommendations to assist auditors in the 
performance of complex tasks. The profession is likely keen on implementing expert AI systems 
because human specialists are both a costly and scarce resource, and research has noted that audit 
teams are sometimes reluctant to use specialists because of the associated costs (Bratten et al. 
                                                 
12 It is also possible that auditors are reluctant to adjust management’s estimates in the specialist system condition 
because they believe it will be difficult to persuade management to adjust the estimate based on AI-produced audit 
evidence. Accordingly, we ask participants to rate the likelihood that management could be convinced to adjust an 
estimate primarily based on the evidence provided by the specialist system or human specialist. Participants in the 
human specialist condition rated this likelihood as higher than those in the specialist system condition (p = 0.01, 
untabulated). However, similar to our analyses related to Source_Expertise, when we control for this Convincing 
measure in our ANCOVA and PROCESS models, the significance of our results and our inferences are unchanged. 
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[2013], Griffith et al. [2015a], Griffith [2014]). While the audit profession is optimistic that the 
implementation of AI will enhance audit quality, research has not examined how auditors will 
interact with these new specialist systems or how AI might influence the way auditors evaluate 
evidence. Prior research in psychology and management science, however, documents that 
individuals are susceptible to algorithm aversion – the tendency to discount computer-generated 
advice more severely than human advice. Thus, if algorithm aversion occurs in auditing, there 
could be significant consequences for the performance of audits, and particularly for the high-
risk audit areas that require specialist expertise. Motivated by these concerns, this study 
examines how algorithm aversion manifests in the context of auditing complex estimates.  
Consistent with theory, we find that algorithm aversion impacts how auditors consider 
contradictory evidence provided by their firm’s specialist. Specifically, we find that, when 
management employs a relatively more-structured estimation process, auditors more heavily 
discount their firm’s contradictory evidence when that evidence comes from a specialist system 
instead of a human specialist. This finding demonstrates that algorithm aversion amplifies the 
persuasive effect of greater estimation structure. It is important to note that managers have 
discretion over their estimation methods and inputs, as well as other persuasive attributes of 
evidence (e.g., quantification of evidence; Joe et al. [2017]). Therefore, our findings suggest that 
algorithm aversion among auditors can make management’s strategic attempts to influence 
auditor judgments through these evidence attributes more effective, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of auditors accepting their client’s potentially biased estimates. More broadly, our 
findings also raise the concerning possibility that algorithm aversion might increase the overall 
effectiveness other management persuasion tactics (e.g., explicitly stated preferences, 
concessions, ingratiation) (Jenkins and Haynes [2003], Wolfe, Mauldin, and Diaz [2009], 
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Robertson [2010]). Thus, we highlight a possible unintended consequence of employing 
cognitive technologies in the audit setting.   
Our study makes significant contributions to two streams of research. First, our findings 
have implications for research related to auditing complex estimates. PCAOB inspection findings 
indicate that auditors frequently fail to consider contradictory evidence identified by valuation 
specialists (PCAOB [2017a]). Furthermore, qualitative evidence suggests that jurisdictional 
motivations can lead auditors to discount (or even alter) the evidence provided by specialists if 
that evidence does not conform to their own perspective (Griffith [2019]). Research also finds 
that implemental mindsets and lower risk perceptions can increase auditors’ propensity to 
incorrectly conclude that management’s biased estimates are reasonable (Griffith, Hammersley, 
Kadous, and Young [2015], Griffith [2018]). We extend this literature by identifying estimation 
structure as a contextual feature of management’s estimation process that causes auditors to have 
more favorable perceptions of management’s estimates and increases auditors’ willingness to 
discount contradictory evidence, particularly if that evidence is produced by an AI system.  
Second, our study contributes to emerging research in psychology and management 
science around algorithm aversion. Prior studies that document algorithm aversion effects do so 
in more objective, less complex, and low-stakes task settings. Our findings demonstrate that, in 
the audit setting, the effects of algorithm aversion are nuanced and contextually-dependent. We 
document that algorithm aversion manifests in the behavior of experienced professionals with 
strong incentives to rely on the related computer-generated evidence – but only in the context 
where they judged the opposing evidence to be particularly strong. Our findings also demonstrate 
that in settings with competing information, algorithm aversion serves to amplify the persuasive 
effect of the evidence attributes under consideration. 
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Our study is subject to some limitations that provide several interesting opportunities for 
future research. First, we examine the effects of algorithm aversion only in the setting of auditing 
complex estimates, which can be a highly challenging and highly subjective task for auditors. 
We use this specific setting because audit firms are currently directing their AI investments 
toward similar efforts (e.g., KPMG [2016]). Future research might examine auditor reliance on 
AI in more objective audit tasks. Second, this study measures auditors’ reactions to a new and 
novel source of audit evidence. It is possible that the effects we detect will change over repeated 
exposures that reduce this novelty. Specifically, auditors might become more willing to rely on 
these systems as they become more familiar with them. That said, previous research finds that 
individuals are more willing to rely on algorithms when they have no experience using the 
algorithm because they have not seen the algorithm err (Dietvorst et al. [2015]). With repeated 
exposure and usage, auditors are also likely to encounter both positive and negative experiences 
as they use AI systems. Future research could examine how the valence of these experiences 
shapes the way auditors rely on these systems. Finally, future research could explore theory-
grounded interventions that mitigate the effects algorithm aversion and, ultimately, help the 
auditing profession recognize the full benefits of its investments in cognitive technologies. Our 
study takes the important first step of identifying when and how receiving audit evidence from 
an AI system alters auditor decisions around complex accounting estimates.   
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APPENDIX A 
Comparison of Source Treatments 
 
 
 Human specialist condition Specialist system condition 
 
Source of audit 
evidence: 
 
 
Your firm’s department of 
specialized professionals 
 
Your firm’s proprietary AI system 
 
 
Qualifications:  
 
“These internal valuation 
specialists have advanced degrees 
and professional certifications. 
They also have significant 
experience with audits of 
commercial loans (on large 
numbers of clients), and they 
continue to receive extensive and 
rigorous training in their areas of 
expertise.” 
 
 
“The firm has invested significant 
resources developing and 
supporting the valuation group” 
 
 
“To develop the Amadeus system, 
your firm partnered with a large 
international technology company 
with leading experts in artificial 
intelligence. Additionally, the firm 
gathered input from valuation 
specialists with expertise in 
commercial loan grading (e.g., 
advanced degrees, professional 
certifications, significant experience, 
and extensive and rigorous training).” 
 
“The firm has invested significant 
resources developing and supporting 
the Amadeus system” 
 
 
Method:  
 
“applies firm-approved methodologies to evaluate information from a 
variety of sources…uses information from clients as well as external 
information to develop independent loan grades” 
 
Firm endorsement: 
 
“Your firm has indicated that the [Amadeus system’s/internal valuation 
group’s] overall predictions are reasonably accurate and are considered 
an approved source of audit evidence” 
 
 
Notes: The purpose of Appendix A is to demonstrate how the language in our instrument equalizes legitimacy and 
credibility across the human specialist and specialist system conditions. 
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APPENDIX B 
Structure Manipulation 
 
Lower Degree of Structure 
 
Our commercial loan portfolio is unique and highly diversified. Therefore, we relied heavily on 
the expertise of our loan officers and credit analysts when updating collateral values for our 
12/31/2017 allowance calculation. Specifically, our loan officers and credit analysts determine 
whether the most recent appraisal still reliably reflects a property’s current market value.  
 
When these parties determine that an appraised value is “stale”, they must either order a new 
appraisal, obtain a Broker Price Opinion (BPO), or document an alternative valuation based on 
research. BPOs are significantly less comprehensive than appraisals; however, BPOs can be 
performed more quickly because they account for less data. When neither a current appraisal nor 
a current BPO is available, loan officers and credit analysts collaborate to update the most recent 
appraised value based on their own research (e.g., comparable sales, local market trends, 
discussions with brokers). For the majority of the loans in our portfolio, our loan officers and 
credit analysts relied on either BPOs or independent research to update appraised values. 
 
 
Higher Degree of Structure 
 
Our commercial loan portfolio is unique and highly diversified. Therefore, we relied heavily on 
detailed market data when updating collateral values for our 12/31/2017 allowance calculation. 
Specifically, we obtained detailed monthly data from the RCA and NCREIF price indices at the 
industry level for each of the metropolitan markets in which the collateral underlying our 
commercial loan portfolio is located. Depending on the property type/metropolitan market 
combination, annualized increases in collateral values varied from 0.2% to 19.1%.  
 
We then used the detailed monthly information from these indices to update collateral values 
from the appraisal date to 12/31/2017. For example, office properties in Indianapolis increased 
by 0.8%, 0.7%, and 0.8% in October, November, and December, respectively. We would 
therefore apply those respective changes to update a 9/30/2017 appraisal for an office building in 
Indianapolis over the period from 10/1/2017 through 12/31/2017. 
 
 
Notes: Appendix B presents how structure in management’s estimation process is manipulated across the higher and 
lower structure conditions. 
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Notes: Figure 1 presents the flow of the experimental design. 
 
* Source is manipulated as human specialist or specialist system. 
** Structure is manipulated as higher estimation structure or lower estimation structure within the client’s estimation process.
FIGURE 1 
Experimental Design Flow 
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Notes: The dependent variable is participants’ proposed audit adjustment (in millions). We manipulate the source of 
the audit firm’s evidence at two levels (human specialist versus specialist system), between participants. We also 
manipulate the degree of structure in management’s estimation process at two levels (lower versus higher), between 
participants.  
  
FIGURE 2 
Graphical Representation of Results 
 A 
 B 
 C 
 D 
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FIGURE 3 
Moderated Mediation Analysis 
 
Panel A: Model 8 Moderated Mediation 
 
 
Panel B: Model 15 Moderated Mediation 
 
 
 
 
Notes: ** denote statistical significance equivalent to p < 0.05, one-tailed, respectively  
 
a We use confidence intervals from bootstrapped sampling distributions (based on 10,000 bootstrap samples) to test 
the significance of indirect effects (Hayes [2018]). Since we have directional predictions for all indirect effects, we 
use 90% confidence intervals (i.e., bounded at 0.05 and 0.95) to test whether one-tailed p-values are less than 0.05. 
 
b We test the significance of this difference (calculated as βwa * βb in Panel A and βa * βwb in Panel B) to determine 
whether the effect of Structure is mediated by Quality of Management’s Evidence, contingent on Source.   
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Panel B: ANOVA Results 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares    df    F     p 
Structure 1,283.77 1 11.84 < 0.01 
Source 1,223.91 1 11.29 < 0.01 
Source × Structure 433.25 1 4.00 0.02 
Error 17,997.05 166   
 
 
Panel C: Simple Effects of Structure 
 df   F     p 
Across Human Specialist: Cell A > Cell C  1,166 1.11 0.15 
Across Specialist System: Cell B > Cell D  1,166 13.89 < 0.01 
     
 
Panel D: Simple Effects of Source 
 df F     p 
Across Lower Structure: Cell A > Cell B  1,166 1.01  0.16 
Across Higher Structure: Cell C > Cell D  1,166  13.21 < 0.01 
     
Notes: The dependent variable is participants’ proposed audit adjustments. We manipulate the source of the audit 
firm’s evidence at two levels (Human Specialist versus Specialist System), between participants. We also 
manipulate the degree of structure in management’s estimation process at two levels (lower versus higher), between 
participants. Consistent with our directional hypothesis, all reported p-values are equivalent to a one-tailed test. Our 
unbalanced cell sizes reflect differences in both manipulation check failure rates and otherwise unusable responses. 
All three of the participants who indicated they had inadequate public accounting experience (i.e., less than one 
year) were randomly assigned to Cell D and were excluded from our final sample. Additionally, we excluded three, 
nine, five, and twelve participants from Cells A, B, C, and D, respectively, due to manipulation check failures. 
Although the cell sizes are unbalanced, Levene’s [1960] test for equality of variances is not significant (F1,166 = 1.93; 
p = 0.13, two-tailed), indicating that the assumption of homogeneity of variances has not been violated in our 
ANOVA model.  
TABLE 1  
Hypothesis-Testing Model  
 
Panel A: Proposed Adjustments by Condition: Least squares mean (delta-method standard error) [n] Cell 
 
   Lower 
Structure  
Higher  
Structure  Overall           
  Human Specialist 22.13  19.81  20.97 
 
  (1.52)  (1.58)  (1.10) 
 
  
  [47] 
 
[43] 
 
[90] 
 
  
    A 
 
C  
  
            
  Specialist System 19.94 
 
11.20  16.13 
   
  (1.55)  (1.76) 
 (1.17) 
 
  
  [45] 
 
[35] 
 
[80] 
 
  
  
 
B 
 
D  
  
              
  Overall 21.04 
 
15.51   
 
   (1.09) 
 
(1.19)   
   
   [92] 
 
[78] 
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Source 
Sum of 
Squares    df    F     p 
Structure 1,168.27 1 11.31 < 0.01 
Source 425.96 1 4.06 0.02 
Source × Structure 338.14 1 3.22 0.04 
Objectivity (covariate) (two-tailed p-value) 182.77 1 1.74 0.19 
Source_Expertise (covariate) (two-tailed p-value) 458.97 1 4.37 0.04 
Error 17,213.47 164   
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is participants’ proposed audit adjustments. We manipulate the source of the audit 
firm’s evidence at two levels (Human Specialist versus Specialist System), between participants. We also 
manipulate the degree of structure in management’s estimation process at two levels (lower versus higher), between 
participants. All tests include the effects of the covariates Objectivity and Source_Expertise. Consistent with our 
directional hypothesis, all reported p-values are equivalent to a one-tailed test, unless otherwise noted. 
 
TABLE 2  
Analysis of Covariance Results  
            
